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Thursday, October 1, 2026

limits of language, qualia, and the thing in itself

Any natural language, except maybe Pirahã, an extremely primitive language of an extremely remote Amazonian tribe, is capable of describing just about anything in the physical world. Ideas too, can be captured by language, even the most abstract, as long as they are coherent ideas, and even some incoherent ideas can be well described. 

One area notably can't be described: sensations -- in the philosophical discourse, qualia. How does sweetness taste? Sugary? And how does sugar taste? Oh, sweet. Like doughnuts. How do doughnuts taste? Sweet again. Or what does green look like? Same problem. 

Qualia can't quite be described. Why? Is it because they're not phenomenal, that is, not part of the physical world as we know it. Or is it that they have no structure or form, unlike ideas? Or is it because they can't be represented, reconstructed or implemented outside of themselves? 

They're entirely noumenal, using Kant's convenient word: they are not part of our perceived world, they are those things in themselves, what the things are to themselves, you might say, the inner self of the thing. Every person is a perceptible thing to others and to oneself. But there's also the inner self that only you have access to. Kant thought that holds of all things -- they exist as themselves inwardly besides generating impressions on us that we perceive as information and call "things in the world" or "phenomena" using his word. 

It's not that qualia or consciousness, are emergent properties of complex phenomena, as, for example, Sean Carroll assumes. They are not phenomena at all. This seems to me to naturally imply panpsychism: feelings are our noumenal being. If feelings are the distinct properties of noumenal being, then why shouldn't all beings have some inner nature akin to qualia however primitive. It would be odd if they didn't and only humans had this inner noumenal being. Why should humans be so special, if qualia are merely the noumenal being of a thing in itself? 

And that's why panpsychism makes sense. The sense experience of being is ineffable because it is not a signal, it's a thing in itself. A passive thing in itself -- it's not a behavior, and it doesn't affect its surroundings. It's an internal passive state of being, like a mere observer, a being-feel, not a do-er. We can describe every phenomenon with language by describing the behavior, the interactions, the external relations. Being in itself, we can't describe. 

Consider how we know things. It's by their external behaviors, measured by their interactions with us or our tools, our poking and prompting, experimenting and investigating. We can prompt and poke qualia, but they have no external behaviors. Their responses are internal. 

The idea that a thing could be entirely passive is a strange one, hard to wrap one's head around. Normally, everything that changes, changes actively. But qualia change passively. 

Similarly, the mind isn't observed, it's an in itself -- no brain observing its own actions. It's the thing in itself. 

You might object that qualia surely interact with our decision-making process. we received information from the world; we respond with a qualitative like or dislike and make our action decisions based on those preferences. But there's a lot of evidence that actually, we decide before we are aware of our decisions. Our awareness serves to justify the choices we've unconsciously made. I've written a couple of posts on this -- the spark bird, the unconscious mind is rational, the conscious mind is not. Is it possible the the unconscious decision-making mind responds to the qualia? Is it possible for a noumenal unconscious mind to access the conscious qualia? Why not? 

Or is it possible that the passive inner qualia can influence the causal mechanisms of decision-making? How?


anti utopia and utopians

Four reasons to reject utopianism

1. the world is too complex for a utopia to be realized as conceived. It's just not gonna be what you expect. 

2. it's better to target specific ills than to target an entire society. The risks and stakes of larger targeting are vastly higher than targeting something specific and local. The smaller your target, the less complexity.  Even systemic problems should probably be solved as specifically and locally as possible -- if possible.

3. the world is too complex to get to utopia from here. So it's unwise to sacrifice the now for the sake of a future that will probably never arrive. 

When the system is so bad that there's nothing left to lose, then revolution makes sense, but don't expect utopia out of it. In the social world, actions often engender a greater and opposite reaction, and revolutions are often won by superior weaponry, not the ideal outcome since the weapons that won the revolution will likely be turned on the public that lost revolutionary conflict, the regime having won through force not through consensus. 

4. technology and social evolution change the conditions of the world such that what might seem a utopia from the perspective of current conditions, or the current means to achieve utopia, become irrelevant. There is nothing quite so depressing as reading the urban plans of the past, even of the recent past like a few decades ago. They are not just irrelevant to today, they would now be considered counterproductive, even destructive. At best, laughable, maybe. 

5. most important of all, utopia is a contradictory state. People like problem-solving. It's engaging and engagement is more rewarding than mere happiness. If happiness were the goal of life, no one would have children. Utopia is a kind of lame, abstract and stupid. When you're engaged, you forget all about happiness. What is more engaging than a problem to solve? In other words, there's no such thing as utopia. Can life be better? Yes. So again, the small targets are the ones worth pursuing, like lessening inequalities -- not eliminating them, but ameliorating the worst of it. Expect the future to have complaints. Justifiable complaints. That's good. Something to solve, and roles for people to solve them. (But amongst all the complaints it's all too easy to forget about the oblivious obvious -- the 99% of life that actually works.)

6. utopianism is a cheap way out, rather than facing and solving problems that might have solutions.  Solutions can be difficult and require complex understandings that require hard work. The utopian too easily blames it on an impossible system and opts for a simplistic fantasy dream -- problem solved, no work, no understanding, no learning of how things work and why they fail. This kind of simplicity btw, is a recipe for failure. It's a lot like god-of-the-gaps or conspiracy theories' cui bono + post hoc ergo propter hoc, one simple answer to every event. The elites did it, whoever they are. Utopia will fix it all. 

emergence and reductionism: free will and the map

How is reductionist theory different from emergent theory? Here's a distinction among the consequences of these theories: determinism and free will. 

On the reductionist view, the causal chain is determined and there's no such thing as free will. But choices are made with imperfect knowledge, including imperfect knowledge of the causes of one's choices. My decisions are the result of a complex of conscious thoughts and biases mistaken for truths, and unconscious pressures: the choices are emergent. We attribute those choices to the person from which the choices emerge, even though there are unknown influences on the person, unknown as to whether those influences were effective causes, necessary conditions or even ignored or fended off and dismissed influences. 

The emergent result is "this is my choice, chosen freely", when actually it's ''this is my choice and here is my story about why I made this choice, but how this all actually happened is strictly beyond my pay grade as a human being.' Introspection affords little help -- the biases obstruct introspective clarity and the influences are not little locateable objects lying about in the skull's cavity to be discovered. Psychiatry is not a treasure hunt. If it were, it'd be successful. 

Think of a map designed for a specific task: to show the possible routes from place A to B. Must it include the shrubbery on the sidewalks? That's not relevant to the goal. Will it tell you how the roads were developed or who laid them out? The history is also irrelevant. The map shows only what's necessary for getting from A to B, the roads, their directions and maybe the landmarks and addresses along the way. Free will is like this kind of map. The information on the map of decisions includes the street names of our stories we tell about ourselves. How those stories got there is not accessible to us (see the myth of introspection post). We're stuck with these stories and these streets, whether it be to congratulate ourselves ("I chose right -- clever me!") or punish ourselves ("It's all my fault"), though when things go wrong, we are more likely to opt for the reductionist theory to find excuses and blame it on them. 

When I was young, maps were made of paper and were mostly schematic. There were some maps that represented buildings, but certainly not anything as detailed as a satellite image. Technology advances our knowledge. I expect the map of decision-making will, like a Google map of the mind, show us more and more about our psychology. 


activist agendas in the sciences

Political agendas raise valuable questions in any social science. Were it not for feminist linguistics, I might not have looked carefully into the role of the referent in pejoration, an important aspect of semantic shift, or the distribution of colloquial terms for abuse of authority and what it tells us about gender. Those questions are invaluable, leading to deep insights...as long as the agenda doesn't bias the results. 

As much as a political agenda can raise important and valuable questions, it can also stifle the research if the movement grabs the first results, waves it prominently as some kind of banner and places too much importance on it. As a standard for the movement, it may effectively intimidate researchers from further research. It may also undermine the credibility of the movement if intrepid researchers find that the first grab results turn out wrong. 

We should never fear that results of further research won't align with our political agenda. If there is an injustice, it will emerge in the results as long as we continue to pursue that research. That's why academic freedom matters -- the underlying injustices require relentless pursuit, not grabbing the first flag of evidence and waving it. 

Academic research and activism are very different in method and goal. The activist world is one of factional interests in a competition for power. It's a drama of conflicts. In the drama of policy, the activists must express their interests as loudly and one-sidedly as possible otherwise it will not be heard at all under the magnified megaphone of authority and the interests authority serves. Truth is not the priority. Need, cure, repair for injustice, are. The world of politics is like an opera: each role has an aria and only that role gets to sing that song. If that aria is not sung, the plot cannot move forward, and if it isn't sung clearly over the orchestra to the furthest reach of the theater, the audience will not all fully understand what the story they are witnessing is about.  Academia is supposed to be a place apart from that dramatical theater. The academic world is ideally one of truth-seeking, not interest-serving. The meeting of these two social locations -- activism and academicism -- is inevitable, but mutually dangerous. Research can amplify the activist voice, but muffle the academic calling, and because science is unstable, activist reliance on it is precarious. 

(To give credit where due, it was Michael Shenker, the leader of the squatters movement in Manhattan, one of the most brilliant talkers I've ever met, came up with that opera analogy. No surprise, he was himself a musician.)

Is there a solution or best balance? The IQ inheritance debate tells us, no, there can be no best balance, a problem with only unsatisfactory options. The debate seems to be stalled at: either accept the state of the science and abandon DEI, or doubt the science and trust that DEI will improve outcomes for the next generation at the expense of the current. The third option is the whatabout answer: there has always been plenty of dysfunction among the privileged whites or Jews or whatever, that hasn't prevented the economy, the academy, the society and the nation from progressing and thriving. 

We seem to be able to sustain plenty of drag. That's sort of the long history of the agrarian revolution. Technology allows us to thrive and progress even when the species declines. That's exactly what technology is for: conveniences to allow people to do less, know less, care less, and self-monitor less. It works!

I'd categorize the IQ-inheritance issue along with "gay marriage will turns us all gay" and Jordan Peterson's "pronouns will destroy Western culture and the Collective Unconscious". It's not a mountain, bro, it's a mole hill. Take off your magnifying glasses and look around you. The sky is not falling. Yes, there's a coupla clouds. Aren't they pretty? If you seed them, they might rain and then you'll need to run for cover. 

*******

A colleague wrote a letter to a conservative newspaper in the Midwest, introducing herself as an academic and an activist. I thought, isn't that just feeding the conservative bias that academics aren't interested in research into truth, only promoting their personal political agendas and social identity? 

There are often good reasons why academics in the social sciences tend to be non conservative. In the post on the hierarchy of data*, you'll see that the data of the social sciences -- the difference between what people say or think they are doing and what they actually do -- necessarily reveals hypocrisy in the society. It's impossible to avoid. 

Not all social scientists object to the hypocrisy -- social illusions can provide social coherence, stability, direction and wellbeing --  but they can't deny it's there. So it shouldn't be surprising that social scientists would be skeptical of conservatism since conserving the illusions means conserving a degree of hypocrisy or at least, conserving falsehoods. The progressive inclination among the social sciences is not all the result of a culture of liberalism, it's actually a reflection of the truths uncovered by the science. That's a legit side of the social sciences, observing social beliefs and testing them against the social realities. 

The public, of course, is the bearer of these social beliefs, so people are often not aware of the disparities between what they believe and reality since we interpret reality through what we believe. It's natural for the public to view social science research as a biased political agenda, even when that research is double blind, controlled, unbiased, and replicated. You sort of have to be in the science to recognize when it's skepticism of the scientist and not the liberal activism of the university culture. 

Adding to this public distrust of this skeptical science, are the overt political agendas in academic research popularly called "woke". As mentioned, progressive political agendas play two roles in academic research. One is to pose questions that would not have been asked without the activist instigation. This is extremely valuable, since the university has a cultural tunnel vision, as all institutions have, and it needs to be pushed to see beyond its walls. 

The other role is more troubling. As soon as an activist question is raised, researchers are likely to look for evidence in favor of the activist agenda. Once found, the activists take the ball and run with it, as if a research program ends as soon as one obtains the result desired. 

Back in the 1970's, Robin Lakoff published a hypothesis that women's language reflects their disempowerment. Women, she wrote, are less assertive in their language, more polite, less direct and less free with vulgarities. The plausibility of the hypothesis is obvious, and, as I've written elsewhere, finding supportive evidence for just about any hypothesis is easy. But about thirty-five years later, a grad student at CUNY did a brilliant study of a huge corpus of women's and men's telephone customer service conversations. At the same time, the movie industry produced a data mine of all Hollywood scripts. She analysed both corpuses to see whether Lakoff's hypothesis was predictive. 

What she found was that in the telephone conversations, the women and men used just as much polite, indirect, cautious and vulgar language. But in the movie scripts, Lakoff's hypothesis predicted accurately, almost too accurately. And of course the vast majority of Hollywood scripts are written by men. 

In other words, Lakoff had assimilated or reproduced in her hypothesis the male (mis)perception of women express themselves as second class, disempowered, and weaker. But it is a misperception, at least linguistically. Women are linguistically as strong, forceful, vulgar and direct -- at least they are when alone on the phone -- as men. 

To me this demonstrates an important principle that a lot of post modernism undermines, and that's human agency. What the culture or the language gives us is a limited range of symbols tied to values and meanings, but how you use them is your agency, just as the language has a relatively finite vocabulary, but you can use them to express an unbounded variety of ideas of your own. The post on two theories of gender describes one Marxist theory that ignores agency, and a linguistic theory that allows and even encourages agency. 

The gender equality paradox also has two interpretations, one social-determinist, the other agentic. Why do engineers in gender unequal societies reflect the sex demographics (~50% of engineers are women)  while more gender equal societies have the fewest ratio of engineers? One popular answer among social justice warriors is: equality has not erased cultural oppression. A more consistent answer: where women are give full choice, they opt for more rewarding work. Why sit in front of a screen all day in a cubicle manipulating symbols that you spent years studying when you could be playing with children or helping the ill who desperately need you and reward you with gratitude and respect? Women have agency, despite the cultural stereotypes or cultural expectations.

In the post on Ban Bossy, you will see that, contrary to Cheryl Sandburg's claims, people in our society object intensely to male abuse of authority, with a host of colorful slurs from jerk, motherf***er, douche, douchebag, dick, dickhead, scum, scumbag and schmuck to asshat and fucktard. For women, there's only the b-word for abuse of authority. 

Examining the common disparaging words for women turns up dits, twit, airhead, bimbo and cow. These tell us a lot about our male-dominated language and cultural attitudes and gender expectations. All the words for women represent the opposite of abuse of power. They typically describe "pretty but useless", a lack of power or ability to manipulate, and in the case of "cow", useless and not even pretty. The language parallels the gender differences in clothing: male clothing is defined by pockets, pockets are for tools; women's clothing prioritizes the male gaze -- pretty but no tools, useless. 

Notice that these are not people attitudes; they are symbolic cultural categories: the cultural male facing the world with tools to manipulate and control it, the cultural female turned towards the male gaze to gain its attention. It's the Samson and Delilah myth. A myth, ladies and gentlemen: correcting for the availability of words for abuse, it turns out that students object to male abuse of power as much as female abuse of power. 

Now the difference in use of brilliant and genius for  male and female instructors tells a different story of  competitive male self-promotion and female interactive and emotional intelligence. You can read that here*. 

And in the post on euphemisms, the broad-brush hypothesis that words for women have pejorated because women are disempowered, you'll see that the story is much more complex than seems at first sight. 

None of these researches would have been possible without feminist linguists asking new questions. The study is truly fascinating, but when the research ends with the superficial hypothesis, it's neither interesting nor accurate. Science pursued beyond the activist agenda will always be more interesting and surprising than the quick cheerleading response of the activist. 

None of this undermines the activist agenda, by the way. If there is systematic or structural injustice in society -- and anyone but the narrowest and most biased libertarian recognizes that there's plenty of injustice -- that injustice will appear in the research, though not always in expected ways, and very likely in surprising ways one would never have predicted or even guessed. Activists need never be afraid of academic research. And the academic should never settle for the quick fix. 

my enemy's friend is my enemy: false dichotomy of vertical goods in polarization

A flat earther observes that NASA means "deceive" in Biblical Hebrew. He offers this as evidence or proof that NASA is a liar. As if a liar would name himself "Liar" in some foreign language because, you know, if you're a liar you have to let people know it somehow -- what kind of liar doesn't tell the truth? Reminds me of the victory lap the 9-11 inside-jobbers when they saw the interview clip with Larry Silverstein saying "So we pulled it" as if the culprit would announce in public "I did it". Or the folks who explain the UK newscaster anticipating the fall of the second building as reading the government script too early, as if the government would divulge in a script to the entire press their secrets because, you know, if the government didn't give the media a detailed script, the media might not have reported the event or omitted that a second building fell. 

Why do people buy such flimsy, absurd evidence for what they want to believe? An answer lies in these notions of vertical goods and false consensus. 

This is a post about vertical goods, naive realism and false consensus as described in Daniel Stone's Undue Hate, a book everyone should read. Vertical goods are good things the more of which are always better. More food is always better even if you can't eat it all, but what kind of food, well that's a matter of taste, a horizontal good, different at different points. Stone uses housing: more space is always better, given the same price, but location depends on taste, commute, kind of neighbors preferred. Money is a vertical good. What you buy with it, horizontal. 

Thing is, we all have horizontal attitudes towards vertical goods. One person might prioritize freedom over money and prefer to be a struggling entrepreneur rather than be securely well-paid with a boss. (When I was 23 and a bike messenger, I turned down a cushy messenger job for a friendly boss, preferring to be an independent messenger.) When you assume that everyone agrees with your vertical priorities, you've fallen for a naive realism that your preference is the real and true one. The result is a sense of false consensus that everyone has the same priorities as you. When they behave contrary to what you think everyone believes is good, that's when you suspect they are either ignorant or evil. 

Talking to a conspiracy theorist, I mentioned this NASA liar paradox belief. To me this belief is obviously illogical. It's a case of the oblivious obvious. Liars by definition don't go about announcing they're liars regardless of the language. And it's a liar paradox -- if ture, it's false, if false, it's true -- a necessary contradiction. My friend, however, didn't see it as obvious at all. Instead, he responded with suspicion. Of me. 

For me, logic is a vertical good and a priority in assessing what I should or should not believe. If a belief is contradictory, it can't be true, and anyone who believes an obvious contradiction, is either cognitively defective -- ignorant -- or morally so, a person of ill intent. 

But my friend holds a radically different vertical good and one that, obviously, is important to him, but also important to everyone, so he thinks. That vertical good is: freedom. And because government power is dangerously controlling and deceptive, anyone who defends government is a dangerous fool. When I talk about the irrationality of a criticism of a government program, he hears a fool defending a deceitful, dangerous power. I am the friend of his enemy. There must be something wrong with me, since everyone knows that power is dangerous and deceitful. "Why are you defending NASA?" 

The questions you ask determine the answers you get, two beliefs can both be true but wrong. Why do I care about this particular contradiction? Because I find conspiracy theorists full of bad thinking, of course. But am I ignoring their underlying truth that the government is deceitful and that the game is rigged in favor of power and wealth? I am. I'm not playing their game. That's my horizontal preference. It's a bias. 

Reminds me of an interchange between Nathan Cofnas and John McWhorter the linguist. McWharter asked the question that I'd have asked, "What are you getting out of this? Why are you doing this?" Cofnas, who publicized Jason Arday's plagiarism, answered with a question (the stereotypical Jewish strategy of argument : ) "Wouldn't you rather a centrist scholar expose an Araday than a rabid racist social media influencer like Nic Fuentes do it?" instead of answering with the well known truth that he's taking revenge against the institution that canceled him -- Cofnas was himself kicked out of Cambridge for racist statements -- on the one hand, and the obvious delight that some white nationalists and some people of privilege in general take in announcing how superior they are, proud of their immodesty as if it were a devilish pleasure to be the boy pointing out the emperor has no clothes while everyone else is trying to be decent and discreet. It's the Stephen Miller syndrome: everyone knows my folk are superior, but I'm the only person honest (brazen? vile?) enough to tell you to your face. 

Once, on an academic Listserve, I cited a scientific peer-reviewed study showing that the Covid vaccine did not prevent contagion and therefore vaccine mandates had no justification. Mandate supporters concluded that I'm a deplorable Trump supporter and a science denier although I had just cited a scientific publication. Meanwhile the mandate supporters cited Atlantic Monthly, a journalism venue catering to a narrow audience of the center liberals. I'm not sure whether their vertical good here is "politics is more important than science -- anything associated with Trump is evil (this even has a name: Trump Derangement Syndrome)" or "we must appear to be doing good (even when there's no good available to do)" discussed at length in one of my favorite posts the Fool's Errand Attachment: a cognitive bias. And their political attack was just the punishment for not subscribing to their vertical good. 

It's the horizontal choice of vertical goods that reveals our bias. We should be questioning that horizontal more often, not just to understand ourselves, but to understand others. I hasten to add that it is possible to learn ones own bias, but, contrary to a lot of pop psychologist, it's not likely that one can disabuse oneself of one's bias. And if you ask me, one shouldn't. Your bias is you. Learn it, live with it, and learn to live with others. That's the best you can.

the final conspiracy theory

category: sardonic irony

I tell you, conspiracy theories are all generated by the Deep State and the corporate elites to 1) erode civic engagement, 2) distract the public from the complexity of balancing governance and economy, 3) demoralize the public into submission and most of all, 4) prevent the public from educating itself about how governance, society and commerce actually work so that the public will miss the true dangers of governance, society and commerce. It's all a conspiracy concocted by the CIA. Or the Deep State. 

Beware the purveyors of conspiracy theories. They are the shills of the elites. Beware of believing conspiracy theories. You are doing the work of the CIA. It's all planned out. You can see how it has succeeded. No one believes science, everyone believes conspiracy theories. The CIA and Deep State have won. We're lost. 

Conspiracy theories are a conspiracy. Beware. 

expert confirmation and the charlatan's check

Chase Hughes promotes himself as an expert in psyops and psychological manipulation. He says upfront, "I'm an expert" and immediately tells you a factoid that you already know, which makes you think, yes, the expert confirms what I believe! I'm so smart, I knew I was right, and now the expert has confirmed, and this expert is one I will believe because he's telling the truth. 

Compare for a moment this manipulation with science. Science will tell you things you never could have imagined. The earth is round. Space is curved. Time goes slower as you move faster. Chomsky's "language cannot be learned." One after another, scientific information that tells you how little you know, how little you understand. 

He follows up with a warning to beware of others. "You can trust me because I'm warning you about those you shouldn't trust." Indeed, he is an expert in manipulation.  

Here's where the public stands: ignorance and simplicity masquerading as the "real truth", but actually nothing more than commonplaces of ignorance. The quality of information depends on its audience. If it's a human audience, that quality will be low. 

Science caters to no audience. Note the difference in quality.