Any natural language, except maybe Pirahã, an extremely primitive language of an extremely remote Amazonian tribe, is capable of describing just about anything in the physical world. Ideas too, can be captured by language, even the most abstract, as long as they are coherent ideas, and even some incoherent ideas can be well described.
One area notably can't be described: sensations -- in the philosophical discourse, qualia. How does sweetness taste? Sugary? And how does sugar taste? Oh, sweet. Like doughnuts. How do doughnuts taste? Sweet again. Or what does green look like? Same problem.
Qualia can't quite be described. Why? Is it because they're not phenomenal, that is, not part of the physical world as we know it. Or is it that they have no structure or form, unlike ideas? Or is it because they can't be represented, reconstructed or implemented outside of themselves?
They're entirely noumenal, using Kant's convenient word: they are not part of our perceived world, they are those things in themselves, what the things are to themselves, you might say, the inner self of the thing. Every person is a perceptible thing to others and to oneself. But there's also the inner self that only you have access to. Kant thought that holds of all things -- they exist as themselves inwardly besides generating impressions on us that we perceive as information and call "things in the world" or "phenomena" using his word.
It's not that qualia or consciousness, are emergent properties of complex phenomena, as, for example, Sean Carroll assumes. They are not phenomena at all. This seems to me to naturally imply panpsychism: feelings are our noumenal being. If feelings are the distinct properties of noumenal being, then why shouldn't all beings have some inner nature akin to qualia however primitive. It would be odd if they didn't and only humans had this inner noumenal being. Why should humans be so special, if qualia are merely the noumenal being of a thing in itself?
And that's why panpsychism makes sense. The sense experience of being is ineffable because it is not a signal, it's a thing in itself. A passive thing in itself -- it's not a behavior, and it doesn't affect its surroundings. It's an internal passive state of being, like a mere observer, a being-feel, not a do-er. We can describe every phenomenon with language by describing the behavior, the interactions, the external relations. Being in itself, we can't describe.
Consider how we know things. It's by their external behaviors, measured by their interactions with us or our tools, our poking and prompting, experimenting and investigating. We can prompt and poke qualia, but they have no external behaviors. Their responses are internal.
The idea that a thing could be entirely passive is a strange one, hard to wrap one's head around. Normally, everything that changes, changes actively. But qualia change passively.
Similarly, the mind isn't observed, it's an in itself -- no brain observing its own actions. It's the thing in itself.
You might object that qualia surely interact with our decision-making process. we received information from the world; we respond with a qualitative like or dislike and make our action decisions based on those preferences. But there's a lot of evidence that actually, we decide before we are aware of our decisions. Our awareness serves to justify the choices we've unconsciously made. I've written a couple of posts on this -- the spark bird, the unconscious mind is rational, the conscious mind is not. Is it possible the the unconscious decision-making mind responds to the qualia? Is it possible for a noumenal unconscious mind to access the conscious qualia? Why not?
Or is it possible that the passive inner qualia can influence the causal mechanisms of decision-making? How?
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