The Great Reset deception and fake

Maybe the most remarkable instance of conspiracy theory hype is The Great Reset and Klaus Schwab's World Economic Forum. For years I heard about this Great Reset program to control the world -- the super-rich meeting in secret deciding on how to parcel out the future of surveillance and control. 

It didn't seem to matter to this conspiracy theory that the Davos WEF meetings weren't actually secret, that they were often broadcast. I even received videos from the WEF in my email box every couple of weeks. Far from conducting closed meetings to concoct nefarious plots, the WEF and Davos crowd seem to be proud of what they are doing. They want everyone to know as much as possible about it. They seem to want people to engage with their debates and concerns.

What shocked me the most, though, was reading Schwab's own book COVID-19: The Great Reset. To my utter surprise I learned that the Great Reset was not a program or plot at all or even a set of proposals. There isn't a single proposal in it. And that's because The Great Reset refers to the current economy rebounding from the pandemic. That's it. That's all it refers to. Not a plan. Not a proposal. Not a program. It's the economy rebounding however it happens. That's The Great Reset. 

Naming the post-Covid economy a great reset was Schwab's prediction or expectation that the post-Covid economy would rebound from the pandemic with novel technologies of unprecedented power growing and spreading with unprecedented speed. His view of this rebound is that society and gov'ts and ordinary people are not prepared. Given the history of economic growth, he expects that unless we all prepare, the rich will get much richer and more powerful, and the little gal and guy are going to be left on the wayside. The Great Reset, far from a program or a set of proposals, it's the expectation that the economy will rebound out of control -- without any plan. And, without any prep, it'll be business as usual, with ordinary people left with the short end of the stick. He thinks we can do better to protect ordinary folk, prevent further environmental degradation, and rebalance inequalities in favor of the 99%. 

His book doesn't contain a single proposal. It's all conditionals to consider: if people are afraid of future pandemics, they will very likely want to work remotely. More remote work will change the character of cities, of real estate and the fabric of social relations. A lot more zoom. But if people are tired of zoom and want to risk the dangers of socializing in person, they'll want to return to dense cities and offices. Is there a proposal here? No, it's just thinking about what the future may hold and how we might want to prepare for it so we don't find ourselves with our pants down while Elon Musk steals those pants and sell them back to us at a monopoly price from Mars. 

Notice that the conspiracy theory has got the entire thing all upside down. There is no such program called "The Great Reset". The belief that there is such a program is a fiction invented entirely by the conspiracy theorist. The Great Reset itself is a very real, nonfictional thing: it's the economy that we're currently in, the rebound from the pandemic. But it's not a program. It's the absence of any program!

Were Schwab's expectations borne out? Well, Musk is wealthier than ever and LLMs have been widely embraced. But they haven't made all that much of a difference so far. Overall, no, The Great Reset wasn't very great. President Mump is probably more of a game-changer than the economic rebound from the pandemic, which meant inflation for a while and interest rate disruption and that's about it. 

So, yes, Schwab hyped the dangers of the Great Reset. I imagine he was hoping the public would take a greater interest in thinking about how to create a better society for the future. Maybe he got some attention for that program of thinking about prep. His efforts to publicize the debate certainly did fuel a lot of conspiracy theories. Every good deed shall be punished. 

It's worth asking who is deceiving whom, what is fake here and what is real. The conspiracy theory is a fiction. It takes a description of what's really happening in society and renames it as a plan, a nefarious plan devised by a cabal. The fakery, the deception and the nefarious conspiracy is the conspiracy theory -- the conspiracy is the deception. The Great Reset itself isn't even a plan and there aren't even any proposals in it. 

It's very much a piece with the Gates-Musk paradox, which you may read about here. 

In public affairs and in mainstream news media, the focus is on danger. Danger sells, and each news medium peddles its fears to its particular market share of political bias. The Republicans are dangerous to the NYTimes' readers, the Democrats are a national danger to the Fox watchers. Philanthropy, on the other hand, isn't a big seller although it purports to fix a danger. Conspiracy theory does a run around all of it. 

Engagement with politics in the news assumes some kind of investment in political affairs -- that voting, for example, for one party or person and not another will actually matter. Suppose you are convinced that it doesn't matter, that the world is not only beyond your control but also in the control of a remote elite. On such a view, philanthropy can only be a deception, since solutions are impossible. It makes no sense to invest in political affairs since you can make no difference. That's the conspiracy theory mindset. And there's a lot of truth to it. Does the NYTimes reader's vote actually make a difference? Who is the fool here?

Well, both. The conspiracy theorists are wise to their own political impotence, but have fabricated theories to confirm their own distrust and powerlessness. 

The conspiracy theory is the perfect convergence of distrust and fictionalization, Tom Gilovich’s source of bias – must I believe the benign story I’ve been told, can I believe a fiction of fear? Can I make up a story that at once confirms my fear and distrust of information? A conspiracy theory will not only confirm my fear, but because it is contrary to the mainstream story, the fiction will also confirm my distrust of mainstream information. Foolproof!: self-proving reflexive feedback. It’s the perfect, perfect, story.

how the Big Pharma conspiracy theory doesn't get the medical establishment's flaws

Go to any hospital or medical advice website and you'll find this prominent advice on health (the order may differ): exercise; eat lots of fresh fruits, vegetables, legumes, olive oil -- the "Mediterranean diet" -- and fish; don't smoke; avoid drinking alcohol; restrict red meat; don't eat processed meats. Nowhere will you find pharmaceuticals on their list of health recommendations. 

I've written elsewhere about the role of the oblivious obvious -- the tendency to ignore the normal, the frequent, the common and the benign in favor of attending only to the harmful and dangerous, to the unusual that is also unusually scary. The Big Pharma-Medical Establishment conspiracy is a case in point. 

The conspiracy has a rational principle: "Follow the money". Big Pharma is making big bucks, it colludes with a gov't agency, the FDA, doctors prescribe these pharmaceuticals every day, and the insurance companies and the retail pharmacies are all taking their share. So there's a lot of evidence in support confirming the conspiracy theory.

But there's this disconfirmatory evidence and it's in your face -- the oblivious obvious. No medical website promotes pharmaceuticals for overall health. It's all almost exactly what you'd find among New Agey, down home, no-money-to-follow advice: eat well, exercise, avoid unhealthy addictions.

[I've written elsewhere on how misleading and cheap confirmatory evidence is, and how much more information disconfirmatory evidence provides, so I'm not going into it here.]

It's also true that doctors only prescribe pharmaceuticals and not herbal remedies or life-style prevention. That's very much consistent with the conspiracy theory. 

So what's going on? Is there a conspiracy or not? 

Consider why people go to the doctor -- the doctor-visit market. Is it to get life-style prevention advice? While some small percent of people go to get regular check-ups, almost everyone who is in a health crisis and needs immediate intervention goes to a doctor, close to 100% of them. The doctor-visit market is filled with exigent cases. And those who go for a regular check-up, if there's no exigency, they are not prescribed anything except possibly the healthy advice listed above.

A friend goes for a check-up, gets a CT scan which finds that his arteries are 90% occluded. Without immediate intervention, he's likely to die any moment, in fact, it's a wonder that he's alive. Should the doctor advise him to exercise and eat lots of fruits and veggies and send him on his way? 

Why not? Well, for one reason, he'd be sued way up his ass for malpractice. And rightly: the patient needs intervention. The preventative advice is too late. The Mediterranean diet might be prescribed after recovery from the intervention -- in this case minor surgery to insert stents -- but there is an obvious ethical and legal requirement to intervene, not just provide friendly health tips. 

The doctor-visit market is determined by these two phenomena: patients visit doctors for intervention, and the intervention must cover the doctor's legal liability. This is also why the doctor can't prescribe herbs rather than pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceuticals are tested and approved by the FDA, so if they fail, it's not the doctor's fault and the doctor cannot be successfully sued for prescribing the pharmaceutical appropriate to the symptoms presented. 

And why are the herbs not tested and FDA approved? Because the pharmaceutical -- as the conspiracy theorists accurately explain -- makes money for the pharmaceutical industry, the herb doesn't. So there's little funding for herb testing. Of course that's not a conspiracy, it's just what economists euphemistically call a market failure. It's a big failure. 

But it's not the only failure of the medical vocation. As a vocation, doctors have to follow the limits or restrictions of these two phenomena of their market -- patients are there for either testing or intervention and the intervention is either surgery or pharmaceutical. That's all they can offer you. Don't be asking why they don't prescribe herbs or life-style advice or why they don't know about nutrition. It's not their job because they're not in that market. They are in the health exigency market regulated by the FDA and law suits and research funded by Big Pharma. 

It's not a conspiracy, and viewing it as a conspiracy doesn't help understanding it. What helps is to understand that when you go to a doctor, don't expect instant, immediate natural cures. Expect either a pharmaceutical that is legally covered, or surgery that, done by someone with experience, is likely to help, provided that the doctor in question isn't just banking on unnecessary interventions. 

And there are quacks too. As the joke goes, what do you call a C student in med school? "Doctor." 

A friend points out that doctors don't know much about their patients. They don't know the life circumstances that might be causing anxiety or stress. But this is equally true of your acupuncturist who will prescribe based on pulse and a quick look at the tongue. So this criticism of western medicine seems to me to be evidence of an anti-mainstream distrust bias. 

What's the source of the bias? Is it that western medicine refuses to acknowledge traditional methods? This might be an overreaction to the constraints on the doctor-visit market. Doctors can't be recommending methods that aren't legally covered. Now some doctors may be unwarrantedly skeptical of traditional medicine, but without the necessary research, that skepticism can't be faulted even if it can be ignorantly biased: the outcome of skepticism and legal cover are the same. So patients have to learn to fend for themselves, research for themselves, assess the risks and take their chances. 

the two types of conspiracy theories

We're all familiar with conspiracy theories, but not so familiar with their history and development. Their changes over time should tell us something about either society, politics, or social psychology or all of these. 

In 1964, shortly after JFK was assassinated, the historian Richard Hofstadter published a piece called "The paranoid style in American politics" about the history of conspiracy theories running through U.S. politics from the inception of the republic to the 1950's McCarthy era. He finds a continuity and development from the 19th century fears that Catholics are coming to take over our gov't and society, and the urgent calls for action before it's too late, to the 20th century fear that the communists are not just coming to take over our gov't and society, but are already infiltrating gov't, and the urgent calls to root them out before it's too late. 

The common trait of these conspiracy theories are the paranoid "they're coming for us" and "we must act now before it's too late". The conspiracy theories are a call to action.  

In 2014, thirteen years after 9/11, Lance deHaven-Smith published a short book titled Conspiracy Theory in America, in which he identifies the conspiracies that have become familiar in our political discourse, what he calls state crimes against democracy (SCADs), focusing on events perpetrated by gov't itself, not by some group infiltrating the gov't or society. Those conspiracy theories are not about "they are coming to infiltrate our gov't". That alarm is already too late. The agent perpetrating these SCADs is the gov't itself. They control our gov't; they are our gov't. 

Setting aside whether any of these conspiracies are true or not, SCAD theory is a radical departure from the older conspiracy style. For one thing, you can't really do much about SCADs, so the alarmism isn't a call to action so much as a call to understanding, drawing aside the veil of truth. It's a confirming of distrust of the gov't but also of any media that endorse gov't propaganda. It's not just a distrust of a particular immigrant population or political ideology or a particular interest. It's a world of paranoia, with distrust of information at its heart. AI arrives at the worst moment in this trajectory towards distrust of information. The prognosis is dark. 

In 2023, Naomi Klein published Doppleganger, shortly after the Covid pandemic mania subsided. Although she doesn't mention deHaven-Smith, she finds the deHaven-Smith style of conspiracy thinking rampant in the AltRight in its response to Covid: the AltRight sees a gov't lying to us about masks, about vaccines, about the origin of the virus. (Klein assumes and accepts the Democratic-NYTimes/Atlantic/NPR-blue Covid policies, recommendations and propaganda without question and without any scientific support or citation or any support or citation. Almost all of her citations are of fictional accounts -- novels -- about doppelgangers. Lots of those.) Her criticism of these AltRight SCAD theories is that they are missing the real danger which is not Bill Gates plotting to control the world, but capitalism; not a nefarious cabal that run us, but a profiteering system that is out of control. The immediate fear portrayed in the book is the fear of the AltRight appropriating all activism and criticism of gov't and its capitalist system. The AltRight is replacing the Left's Marxist criticism with fringe deHaven-Smith style conspiracy theories. IOW, the purpose of the book is to call the alarm that the AltRight, full of false fringe SCAD conspiracy theories, is coming for us, is infiltrating our politics and social discourse and we must wake up to their threat before it is too late!! 

Full circle. Need I mention that the vaccines, though they seem to have prevented many, many deaths, did not prevent infection or contagion, the virus posed little threat to the younger generation, mask mandates did not work, and the lab leak theory is more probable than the wet market theory. And all of these facts were well-known from the beginning. When the vaccine was first rolled out, those who first got it knew that it would not prevent infection or contagion but would ameliorate symptoms, lowering the likelihood of death by Covid, not saving others from Covid. (I asked the old guys who were the first to be vacccinated, and they were quite clear and candid about it.) Anyone looking at people's masking behaviors, restaurant allowances, flight dinners in crowded plane cabins, use of cloth masks and wearing masks under the nose etc. -- any rational being knew that mask mandates could not possibly work even if masks themselves worked. Contact tracing and forcible quarantining might have worked, but this was not asked of us. 

These facts do not, of course validate the AltRight SCAD theories. It doesn't validate any anti-capitalist theory either. The system to blame is not capitalism, but two-party democracy and a body politic divided between rural and urban, progressive and traditional, professional-prestige-class and disparaged-disrespected class, the educated elite privileged NYTimes readers, who reap the many benefits of the society and its gov't, and the non elites who know they are not respected by those elites; a two party system divided between red team and blue team, Us vs Them, distrust of in-group for the out-group. The structure to blame is the polarization within our society, and the politicization of pandemic response very much aligned with MAGA on one side and Trump Derangement Syndrome on the other. 

To be fair, the facts do validate the AltRight's distrust of mainstream information, and that's the essence of the deHaven-Smith style conspiracy cultivated on the Right. And the facts do something else as well. They show that Klein's unquestioning acceptance of the Democratic-NYTimes/Atlantic/NPR-blue propaganda was wrong. What she gets right is her Hofstadter paranoid conspiracy "they are taking over". Distrust of information is spreading widely. COVID killed trust for many.  

We're living now in a society of conspiracy theories on every side. Social capital -- the trust of one another and of gov't and of gov't for its people -- is waning. Polarization feeds distrust, and liberal democracy -- the engagement of voters in governance and the engagement of government officers in its voter base -- feeds polarization. The erosion of social trust and trust in information may be the great weakness of liberal democracy, its danger and downfall. 

PS after the Trump inauguration: the autocratic means of administration may in the long run be healthy for our divided public. 

fungible and non fungible fictions: money vs religion in war

Whom do you trust, and why? Would you trust someone who believes in a fiction that you know is a fantasy? 

On the neoliberal understanding of international relations, trade fosters international peace since war is an obstacle to trade and wealth creation. Money is transpersonal and transnational -- like math and music, it is a universal language, math a measure, music an emotional manipulation, money a price of value.

Like religion, money is also a kind of fiction based on a faith. In the case of religion, the faith depends a bit more on the individual's investment in the religion than on the coreligionists or their investment. If one's coreligionists all turn atheist, one may maintain one's religion without loss of belief. The faith in money depends entirely on the collective investment. Without that collective faith, no value. 

Unlike religion, money is most valuable to those who have the least of it, yet those with a lot of it stand to lose the most if the currency collapses. These paradoxical asymmetries are not only ironic but socially dysfunctional. 

(Compare, for example: I have no religion, so I have no use for religion at all, aside from an intellectual curiosity about those who believe and the history of believers. And those who are most invested in their religion are impervious to any attack on it. The contrast with money is stark.)

The classical economic idea is that all people have needs, creating a vast demand for certain kinds of goods. On that view, trade and comparative advantage are the most efficient means of wealth creation for everyone. Religions -- and here I'm referring to supernatural-based worship-religions, not philosophical advice systems like the Tao -- are not universal needs and don't respond universally to any basic needs they might serve. Some of us believe in multiple gods, others none but ghosts of ancestors, others have only one, some none at all. Religions are like local currencies, except that there's no currency exchange rate, in fact there's no exchange market at all. When you convert someone to another religion, you expect the convert to give up the old religious doctrines and values, and you're frustrated if they don't. On the contrary, currency is not essentialist at all. One of its main purposes is to serve as a medium of exchange. It's anti-essentialist. It serves some other purpose than itself, and it's a universal purpose.

One might conclude that supernatural religions, lacking an exchange market, wouldn't interact with money, a medium of exchange. But they do in national contests, especially in war, and despite the universal recognition of trade trust. It's because religion is a non fungible fiction. Both properties -- non fungiblility and fictionality -- are essential to its interactive character.

Suppose I have a carrot and I want to sell it. It's not a fiction, but a local resource -- I have it with me, you don't. It has a value on the market, so anyone can see and understand its price, and so anyone can buy it either to use or to resell. It requires only a little trust between buyer and seller to achieve an exchange. 

Suppose I have a religious belief. It has a value to my coreligionists, but it's really a fiction, so not only does it have limited value to the non believers but I know that others don't see its value. Can I trust those others? How can I, when the belief I hold is a fiction that no one else would buy unless sharing that fiction.

The assumption that others will not share the fiction, should incline the believers to justify the fiction to strengthen it. No one is more entrenched in their views than when challenged by criticism. The fact that the religion is an unbelievable fiction doesn't make it any the less believed. On the contrary, its fictionality inspires more steadfastness of belief. The unbelievabilities flourish and multiply in religions -- djinns, angels, devils, ghosts. It's a Pandora's box, an open door to common-fare imaginings (very unlike the extraordinary revelations of science, which are far beyond common imagination, see the post on the mediocrity of art and the unbounded imagination of science).

Religion, like property, leads to conflict. In the case of property, the threat of violence is essential and definitional: "it's mine" means no more nor less than "If you try to take it, imma hurt you" or I'll get someone or some authority to hurt you. But trade, the exchange of resources through money, overcomes this obstacle on the property side. It's the difference between trade and sharing.

Religion has a dual relation to property. If you adopt my religion, I'm none the poorer for it. That's one reason why many are surprised by woke objections to cultural appropriation. You adopt my religion or religious ideas or values, I don't lose; if anything, I win! But if you try to take my religious beliefs from me, then my beliefs are like property, my loss. 

It's often observed that money is a fiction. This is misleading. Money is a fungible fiction, so it facilitates exchange. Not so with non fungible fictions like supernatural religion.

The Gates-Musk paradox and the surprising source of distrust

Ever notice that fringe conspiracy theories surround liberal philanthropists but not brazenly selfish libertarians? 

Bill Gates, who wants to end malaria, not for himself -- he lives in Washington State for god's sake -- but to help the helpless in the tropics (and yes, selfishly to cleanse his conscience and legacy and yes, he invests in the cures, but he could invest those funds elsewhere and earn even more). Gates is the regular target of some of the most nefarious conspiracy theories, among them some of the most absurd ones like promoting vaccines with the intent of inserting a chip in every body to surveil or control us all. 

Meanwhile Elon Musk, who shows no interest in protecting the impoverished or helping the helpless, whose philanthropic trust gives money to his own enterprises -- iow, it's just a selfish money-laundering scheme -- Elon Musk who believes in libertarian selfishness and promotes selfishness, even taking gov't subsidies to float his business and fatten his wallet, who plainly and publicly buys political influence, who really does seem to be intent on actually controlling the world, and who owns the public square itself under the pretense of ridding it of censorship (although his first act was to restrict criticism of himself), this Elon Musk who actually, physically and literally inserts chips in human brains at Neurolink -- that Elon Musk has not a single fringe tinfoil hat conspiracy theory attached to him. Ever notice that? Isn't that odd?

I want to call this the Gates-Musk paradox. 

I want to be clear at the outset, that I'm not complaining that the conspiracy theorist is treating Gates unfairly and I'm not defending Gates' philanthropy. Gates could be a misguided, arrogant, meddling fool and Musk a brilliant hero of our time (though I doubt that, given other of his proposals I've written about here). I'm interested only in understanding the paradox to see it if tells us anything about theorizing and theorists, that is, about human thinking. 

This paradox, btw, is not just true of Gates and Musk. It is a general character of conspiracy theory, maybe even a law. 

Consider Soros, another classic philanthropist spending his money on helping the helpless whether they be despised immigrants or victims of racism or of autocracy. Whatever you think of his goals or his means, they are not selfish. Yes, he wants to influence governments, but to encourage liberal democracy so that all its nation's people have equal access to rule. You can't call that enslaving the world -- forcing people to choose for themselves what they want of their government -- but world enslavement is what he's accused of attempting. Meanwhile, Peter Thiel promotes monopoly as the best business strategy -- not to benefit society or the little guy, but to make most money fastest for the monopolist alone. There are no elaborate fictionalized conspiracy theories or wacky conspiracy theorist calls to alarm surrounding Thiel. But Soros? He's second after the Federal Reserve among conspiracy theory targets. 

Again, I'm not suggesting that Soros' domestic or foreign interventions are good ideas. Personally, I think he's an antiquated relic of the Cold War, the successes of China and Singapore demonstrating that his political proposals are not necessary conditions for social prosperity, and the many market failures of the US sadly demonstrating that his proposals are not sufficient conditions either. Having no crystal ball, I have no idea what will or would be the consequences of his interventions, just as I have no idea what will come of Donald Trump's strategic and antagonistic tariffs on China or his transactional tariffs on virtually everyplace else. It's just remarkable that there are no conspiracy theories targeting Mr. Trump while there are many targeting Soros. 

Or take the Federal Reserve compared with any other bank, say, J.P Morgan-Chase and Goldman Sachs. The Fed pursues a well-defined albeit incompatible mission veering between the Scylla of inflation and the Charybdis of unemployment, and it does this surprisingly well, responsibly and efficiently, given its narrow means, quite unlike the typical dysfunction of government. The giant banks, on the other hand, have no such public-interest mission. Which are the targets of conspiracy theories? You got it: The Fed. 

So what's going on with this Gates-Musk paradox? It seems as if the conspiracy theory crowd have purposely chosen the wrong targets, welcoming the dangerous Musks and Thiels and Kochs and big banks, while shining light on shadows that they themselves have cast for the purpose of shining a light on the unsuspecting. Crazy, no? 

It takes more effort to invent a danger than to acknowledge a public one in plain sight. So why all the attention to the do-goody philanthropists, embracing all the while the self-professed self-oriented and even lying self-promoters? 

The obvious response is that a conspiracy theory has to have an element of secrecy and deception so they can't attach to Musk and Thiel or Charles Koch or the late Sheldon Adelson. And of course that's true about a conspiracy. But consider what that means about conspiracy theories and the theorists' concerns. Are the theorists concerned about nefarious actions and their dangers or are they concerned about secrecy and deception? Is conspiracy theory about danger or about distrust? The Musks and Thiels also do not inspire trust. The conspiracy theorist is not distrustful of the targets, they're distrustful of reality, of information. The essence of a fringe conspiracy is not just distrust, it's the fictionalization of distrust, the irreality that confirms their distrust. 

There's a lot more to be said about this paradox, but I want to stop here with this consequence of it: the paradox means that distrust of reality and information (not of danger nor of conspirators) is the focus of conspiracy theory. It may have been obvious that distrust was the driving emotion or cognitive principle among conspiracy theories. My goal in this post is to provide the evidence that this is so. The paradox is that evidence. 

where the future is behind you

Why do we talk about the future as ahead of us and the past behind us? 

Among the Aymara, an ancient Andean people, it's the other way around. For them, the past is before them, the future behind. That is, the past, which we know with some certainty having actually experienced it, is like what can be seen in front of us. The future, which we aren't certain of, is the unseen, like what's behind us. Given that our vision is our paramount sense, and, like predator species our eyes are both facing front (unlike vegetarian species like squirrels and goats whose eyes are set to the sides of their faces so they can see the focused predators approaching them), this distribution of information -- certainty of the past before us versus uncertainty of the future behind -- makes perfect sense. It makes so much sense that you wonder why we think the future is ahead of us and the past behind. 

A moment's thought provides a good answer. Since we are a predator species, we want to see our prey in order to capture it. We're goal-oriented, desire-oriented. It's all about what we want and how to get it. Our notion of time is a self-interested one. Time, for us, is the answer to what we want. 

The common word "progress" -- a basic notion of time for us -- always means future and always good. By definition! It's more than just a deep cultural bias towards time, it's a cultural value. 

Think about fashion. Fashion is this progress-value stripped bare of any other good. The latest in clothing, architecture, art, trendy ideas -- they are not improvements in any value except that they are not yesterday's style. In the 50's the coolest ties were thin and skirts were long. In the 60's hip ties were thick and skirts very short. Are thick ties and improvement on thin ones? Is there some benefit to a thick tie? Is there any practical use in these trends? Culture critics like to analyse the meaning of these differences, but they forget that a) what's most important is the mere difference from the most recent past and b) meanings are typically justifications after the fact. Fashion is progress without any other good than newness -- mere difference, to use the semiologic word. 

What about the Aymara, then? What is time the answer to, for them? 

An odd feature of the Aymara language is its grammatical encoding of degrees of certainty. It's impossible to say "It's raining" without including a grammatical piece on the verb indicating whether you know it's raining because you have direct evidence (like "I see it is raining now"), epistemic conclusion (I see people opening umbrellas therefore "it must be raining") or various degrees of uncertainty ("I think it's raining', "it's probably raining"). Now, obviously, English speakers can express all these degrees and types of certainty too -- look at the glosses I just gave. But they are not grammaticalized. They are separated into individual words like "might", "must", "know", "probably" and "I think" and are included at the speaker's will, optionally. Certainty -- degrees of knowledge and evidence -- are grammatically inseparable in Aymara.

You can see where this is going. It suggests that these degrees of knowledge grammaticalized in their language have a pervasive influence on their perception and maybe their attitudes and culture. For us, information is self-oriented. To the Aymara, information is not desire, but understanding, the gradations from ignorance to belief to knowledge and certainty. To them time is not the answer to what they want, it's the answer to what they can know. 

Maybe it's too much to suppose that our time perspective is all about individual wants. After all, there are many cultures that are collectivist and not so individualist as ours in the US, and their view of the future is just as predatory as ours is. Roman architecture showed no sign of fashion or progress. They thought their style was optimal so why change? That was generally their attitude towards their culture: "We're the greatest in the world, we rule, why change anything?" including their agriculture, one reason for their collapse. Hero of Alexandria invented a steam engine around the 2nd or 3rd century, but did the Romans use it to improve their agriculture or their transport? They used it to impress visiting barbarians with statues moving their limbs or wings to all appearances miraculously by themselves. Not a progressive vision. It would be unfair to compare their clothing fashions since production was so much slower than ours. But it does seem that their sense of civic virtue contrasts with our individualism. How many prominent Romans fallen out of public favor chose suicide as a noble and dignified choice? For us suicide is all about individual solitary personal despair. Civic dignity? Does George Bush even hide his face in shame much less sit on a sword? 

On the other hand, the Romans did love any new religious mystery and semper prorsum -- always forward -- was a common Latin motto. 

Lakoff & Johnson's Metaphors We Live By shows that these orientation 'metaphors' -- time is in a spatial one dimensional line with the future before us the past behind, or good is up, bad is down -- are arbitrary, and their justifications are post hoc. So you might say that the stock market goes up when it's value increases on analogy with a pile of dollars increasing with its height, but on the other hand, if you pile up a pyramid of gold bars, the greatest value will be at the bottom layer and the very top the very least. "Good is up, the stock market goes up when it increases in value" is arbitrary. Hades was the richest of the gods, his realm the deep down source of all precious metals and gems -- wealth is down. "High" frequency mouse squeaks are down and thunder, the "low" frequency, is up. It's all arbitrary and you can find a justification after the fact for any so-called orientational metaphor. 

I do wonder, though, how much different we'd be if we spoke Aymara and admitted that the future is unseen and unknown. Our individualist future seems short-sighted and narrow. How many physicians will admit that what's understood today will be tomorrow's ignorance, today's cure tomorrow's harm? How many of us, knowing how foolish we were in the past are willing to admit that given what we'll know tomorrow, we must be wrong and foolish now?

simple way to encounter your unconscious mind

It happened like this. I'm lying in bed having just awakened in the morning. But I don't want to get out of bed. Like every day. 

I have no trouble waking up. In the last half century, I haven't used an alarm clock once. I tell myself just before I go to sleep at what time I'll need to wake up, and just like that, I wake up almost exactly to the minute as planned. I learned this in my adolescence from some radio broadcast describing this method. I tried it and it worked. Fifty years later, I still have no trouble waking up when I need to. It's automatic and accurate. Most animals have a kind of accurate internal clock, and this method is merely letting it run a behavior on autopilot. 

Getting out of bed once awake, now that's a whole different problem. 

It's always a struggle. Here's a way to understand the problem. For every moment when I want to get out of bed I want to stay in bed for just one moment longer, and any each tiny moment is not enough to make me late. It's a sorites paradox (exactly which lost hair made me definitively bald) or a mathematical induction (if moment n doesn't make me late and moment n+1 doesn't either, then I should never get out of bed...logic!), and I'm stuck in it in real time. I'm not a believer in discipline. I want the exit from bed to be as magically automatic and seamless as waking up is for me. But it's not. It's a struggle and I lose repeatedly, partly because the logic -- that each tiny moment is not enough to make me late -- is inexorable. And even when that logic fails, I'm still struggling with myself, I want to get up but I don't want to get up. Discipline here just exacerbates the struggle. It might help to structure the waking: stop thinking and just get up. But isn't that just as puzzling? Why doesn't "stop thinking and just do" result in staying in bed? It'a real quandary. 

The morning I'm describing above, I gave up. I thought, I'm getting nowhere, let me just think about what I'm going to teach today after I get up and dressed and out the door. Thinking about what I'm teaching engrosses me, always. There's so much I want to convey to the class, and I want it to be well-ordered but also comprehensive. It's a lot and I'm devoted to it and I'm soon far away in thoughts about systems and explanations of them and misunderstandings about them and ... then, suddenly, I discover I'm sitting on the edge of the bed. When did this happen?? When did I even decide to get out of bed???

I'm sitting on the edge of the bed, but I don't know when I made this decision to get out of bed. There must have been a decision, and it must have happened while I was thinking about teaching. But I was thinking about teaching, not about getting out of bed. 

You can see where this is going. Somewhere in the back of my mind -- to use a locational metaphor that probably will bias my account of what happened -- somewhere some process obedient to the recognized need for me to get out of bed, moved the levers of my motor functions in the brain and I got up and out of bed without my surface awareness. And "I" -- the surface awareness -- didn't learn about it until well after it was all accomplished. 

I thought to myself (to my aware self), if this is really how my mind works and gets tough things done that need to be done -- I get over struggles when I'm thinking about something else --  then I should be able to repeat this process with intent. And so I did the next morning. And every morning thereafter. I never try to get out of bed. I just get immersed in something else, and the decision is made for me unawares. 

And if I could do this in bed, couldn't I do this with other actions? What action? Some other situation in which I never want to exit but must. The hot shower, of course.

By now you recognize what a hedonist I am. In the shower, I have the same problem. For every moment in the shower I always want to stay just one moment longer. It's like that little mathematical induction. I should stay in there forever or until I drop, wrinkled like a prune. How I ever get out of there, I don't know. Or I didn't know, and now I do. It's when I'm not thinking about the shower. It must be how I always get out of there, but never noticed. So I tried the bed method and, lo and behold, it worked. 

Doesn't that imply that all my decisive choices are like this? Done without my awareness?

There's plenty of research that tells us that our awareness is late in the decision process. Christof Koch, in his book The Quest for Consciousness, describes the work he did on this -- but he's just one of many. Deflationary theories of the mind like Chater's also align with this observation, and experiments with split brains confirm that the mind justifies its actions regardless of the sources of its actions, iow, what we, using our folk psychology call our decision-making process -- "I chose to do this because of such and such reason" -- is actually all post hoc: I do; and then my mind invents or figures out a reason convenient to its self-narrative. Descartes got it backwards. Not "I think, therefore I am"; it's "someone's thinking, but it aint me". :-)

What's new here is that I seem to be able to access this process after the fact, and knowing this, I can game it by letting it do its thing without my struggling with it. It knows I need to get out of bed and turn off the hot shower. I don't need to tell it. All I need to do is think about teaching and systems and ideas, or anything that takes me far from the matter at hand. 

The more I attend to this, the more I observe it. Watching my decision-making process has become almost a commonplace, as if I had a constant companion, a kind of double within me. I haven't yet explored all its underground activities. Does it run my biases? Is it the one who loses appetite when I'm in fasting mode? Just how much influence does it have over me? 

And who is this person? Is he (it?) my obedient self, the responsible one, or the one frightened to be late or diverge from the program? Or does he have a variety of intents depending on his mood or on the circumstances. And if gender is an identity signal system, an interactive language, does it even have a gender? It could be hosted by a male body but with no sense of sexual identity at all, just decision-making in response to worries and needs, or maybe at most the needs for the actions given to male sex bodies in our culture and no more gender-narrative than that -- male body with no gender narrative and no identity signals? Or is it sensitive to my gender-signaling needs? It could be my inner heteronormative man. And how can I test this possibly deflationary, flat unconscious mind, aside from just watching its actions post hoc?

More likely, there are many inner Me's. The eater, the exerciser, the self-punisher, the self-lover, the self-defender and self-slayer. Let's not count. 

I observe the automated decision-makers more an more, at almost any moment of action, especially when I'm changing course -- from writing to getting up for coffee or even grabbing for the cup next to me (as I just did), to putting myself together to leave the apartment, check the range to ensure the gas isn't on (post Covid I can't trust my nose to do this anymore). I'm often unaware of these decisions until after I've (one of the other "I"s) made them. And is the other I aware or is it mechanical? Does it have thoughts ever, and insinuate them into my awareness? I intuit that it is immediately connected to the emotions, and the biases that are irrepressibly tied to those emotions. How is that different from having a thought? On a deflationary or flat view of mind, there might be no difference. The Other Me runs the biases, the surface Me merely fictionalizes to itself an identity-signaling Me-story. 

And I do see this social Me and the inner Other I. When I first spy someone that I know I have to socialize with but whom I don't really feel comfortable socializing with, I feel a jolt of negative arousal, almost like fear. Surely that must be the Other inner self. 

This is all far-afield. I only meant to explain how to wake up in the morning and get out of bed with no struggle, no discipline, automatically like magic. Try it. See whom you meet, or who meets you.