Thursday, May 16, 2024

Musk again? A lesson in inefficiency and ambiguity

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, September 1, 2023

A friend, explaining why he admires Elon Musk, describes the efficiency of Musk’s auto-transport tunnel: subway train cars are expensive because they can’t be mass-produced, they require large tunnels the boring of which require exponentially greater energy for every increment of diameter, and trains must support rush hour capacity even on off hours, whereas autos are mass-produced cheaply on the assembly line, they require little tunnel space, and on off hours, only the occupied ones run. He concludes that the Musk tunnel is efficient.

Well not so fast, pun intended. And there’s an important linguistic and conceptual lesson to be learnt from that lack of speed.

The carrying capacity of a packed subway/metro car is about 250 people. The average train is eight cars, so about 2000 people running, in NYC, every two to five minutes in rush hour. Off-loading that efficiency onto autos would require about 2000 autos every five minutes, or about 7 autos per second. A car would have to have 1/7th of a second to load onto Musk’s tunnel platform to meet rush hour demand. Not likely.

Even if that were possible, consider an on-ramp for a midpoint station B from destination A to C. In rush hour, there’d be a constant flow headed from A towards C.

A–>——B–>——–>C

To accommodate cars coming from station B, that traffic flow would have to slow down to allow a car to enter into the single-lane traffic of the tunnel, and the on-ramp itself would have to be backed up for the one-by-one entry onto the tunnel, even if this were all automated. A subway train typically has dozens of stations between its endpoints. Imagine the traffic jam in a single lane tunnel at rush hour, each car containing one person since the 2000 people in each train have now been distributed into individual cars. Depressing.

In other words, the Musk tunnel can’t handle rush hour traffic if used for a metro system. It would probably be so slow that either long lines would drive people away, or it will be priced high enough to prevent long queues. You don’t need to think long and hard to figure which option will be the business model. It only makes sense as a luxury shuttle from airport to hotel district for the business class, with a discount during off hours.

And what does the subway/metro serve? The entire public, the society as a whole, the economy that serves everyone. The inefficiencies of the system are sacrifices to the priority it serves. And it is fast. Very fast by compare!

Tunnels are not new. We know when and where to use them efficiently for the public. There’s a reason why we use tunnels only for A to B destinations, like midtown NYC to Weehauken — nobody needs to get out in the middle of a river.  There are projects that serve money, others that serve the public, and some that serve the vanity of their promoters’ public image.

Here’s the lesson: a grotesquely inefficient idea implemented efficiently remains grotesquely inefficient. Its efficiencies are intended to create more profit for the owner. So of course there will be efficiencies in any business model. That does not at all imply that the business purpose is efficient.

This notion of “efficiency” is trading on an amgibuity between the efficiency of the business idea (Musk’s is not) and the efficiency of its implementation (conveniently for his profit). The inefficiencies reveal the respective purposes: serving the public, the society, the economy as a whole or making money serving a luxury economy. This is why Adam Smith despised the wealthy — their servants could have been employed in the productive economy that serves all, but instead were wasted on serving wealthy individuals with no benefit to the nation’s economy, the wealth of the nation.

And it’s a lesson for the libertarian: because the market supplies demand, in unequal societies the wealthy will be served more and better in ways that are inefficient for the economy as a whole and the nation. Smith’s book is not entitled “The Wealth of Individuals” but “The Wealth of Nations”. Remember that.


Separating elite education from privilege

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, November 11, 2022

As we know, elite universities recreate social inequality by giving the children of wealth and privilege a further credential for the private and public sectors. I promised to post a solution, so I’m posting.

My brilliant friend (the one who doesn’t like attention, so I won’t name him) suggests that the increase of non whites in elite universities is a solution. That may be true, but it’s not at all what I have in mind.

What I mean by separating elite education from privilege is providing an education that separates policy-makers from wealth-makers. Bringing non whites into the power elite does nothing to separate elite education from privilege, it just adds more ethnic ancestries to the power elite, just as workers’ cooperatives merely turn workers into capitalists, where the problems of capitalism remain or are made even worse — imagine all the employees of the oil industry not only having, as a collective, the wealth to influence public energy policy, but also a huge voter block as well directly invested in oil. Owners are always more likely to vote than those who perceive themselves as disempowered. You’ve traded the Koch Brothers for a vast voting brotherhood invested in offloading their externalities onto the rest of us. The tendency for profit to decline, moral hazard (too big to fail), and most of the problems associated with capital’s cycles remain, and worker solidarity with other collectives is lost in the market competition, potentially increasing social polarization. Workers’ collectives solve for extreme wealth inequality, but that’s about all.

One educational idea might be a requirement of all politicians that they have a post-Ph.D.-level credential in political science including a deep background in global history, economics, anthropology, statistics and hands-on experience with a variety of workplaces including lower and higher education, manual labor, social work, finance and commerce and travel & living experience in both industrial and developing nations across diverse cultures. IOW, our administrators should be the most diversely knowledgeable. That’s a high bar and a long educational process — probably as long as a medical degree. So they should be paid well. But wealth-makers should be barred. 

Pie in the sky, but that’s where I’d like to see us head towards — separating the wealth-makers from the policy-makers, starting from the educational system.


Fool’s Errand Attachment as policy

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, July 20, 2022

After posting on the Fool’s Errand Attachment, it occurred to me that the Fool’s Errand Attachment might not be a cognitive bias after all, but is a policy failure, or is not just a cognitive bias but also a policy failure. Executive office holders no doubt feel compelled to show their constituencies that they are solving social problems. A virus emerges, the elected officer can’t just sit by and watch the dead pile up. Something must be done! So mask, get a vaccine, stay home, effectively end education for children, effectively ruin the economy. CO2 levels have gone through the roof, so let’s undermine global improvements of quality of life by curtailing the energy that drives that progress, disregarding entirely that the current atmospheric CO2 is not reduced thereby (CO2 remains in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, as most of us by now know, unless it is removed) so if CO2 will warm the planet, even zero emissions won’t prevent it (and I haven’t heard Greta Thunberg or Extinction Rebels scold us that we’re not spending more on carbon sequestering or on preparing to welcome climate refugees). That’s the fool’s errand attachment. And once a government has instituted a useless program, it’s hard to crawl back and admit failure. It just looks better to push it to the bitter end and declare victory amidst the ruins than stand there with egg on one’s face and be labeled “WRONG STUPID HARMFUL” which would be political suicide for the next election cycle. Like capital, politicians have limited interests that make them systematically dysfunctional.

A brilliant friend pointed out to me — I’d name him but he doesn’t like attention — that these fool’s errands proliferate in countries where the politics is polarized. The one nation that did not succumb to Covid foolery was Sweden, which is not polarized and where the people actually trust their government to make wise and even difficult decisions. In polarized nations, it’s much harder for office holders to make difficult decisions, since their opposition is lying in wait for any weak point of policy.

So whether it is a cognitive bias, it does seem to be a policy problem. On the other hand, the comparison with conspiracy theorizing is I think a revealing one, and maybe the best part of the post on Fool’s Errand Attachment (see the post below).


Fool’s Errand Attachment: a cognitive bias

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, July 14, 2022

How about this for a new cognitive bias to add to the 38,407 so far identified cognitive biases: Fool’s Errand Attachment, grasping onto a “solution” where there is no solution; attaching oneself to a policy to the degree of need for a solution, not to the degree of its effectiveness, clinging to a program because there is some perceived desperate problem to solve, not because the program will work. Examples: 

The fears about inflation from the Russian invasion of Ukraine — and the selective sanctions — tell us that we’re incapable of getting off fossil fuels now nor for the foreseeable future, and we all know it. And even if we did give up on the fossil fuel addiction, we’d still be stuck with the current excessive atmospheric CO2 levels for hundreds of years. So if atmospheric CO2 will warm the climate, then it’s already too late to fend off climate change, yet the solution so many have invested in, emotionally, politically and morally, is the goal of zero emissions. That is, we still grasp for solutions where there is none, ignoring the inevitable mitigations that we should be focusing on and trying to solve now when we still can. (The IPCC’s recent report is finally recognizing the inevitability and the need for focusing on mitigation.) In other words, aiming for zero emissions, though it would have other benefits like reducing air, water and soil pollution, is no solution to human-induced global warming. And there are other measures we should all be focusing on but aren’t — like preparing and providing for the inevitable mass relocations of populations who are without the resources in this world of ownership to save themselves.  

Notice which people are attached to this non solution, how strongly they hold it and how narrowly — to the exclusion of mitigations or sequestering programs. Extinction Rebellion and Greta Thunberg are only the most prominent examples of this narrow devotion to a program that will do absolutely nothing to change the climate. 

Another: Even when the research tells us that only KN95 masks are effective, mask mandates still apply to any kind of mask. In this case, the urgent need lies in those who don’t have an effective mask. But we don’t then allow them to walk freely without a mask. Not only do they use useless masks, but we expect them to use those useless masks, rather than accept that those who can’t access an effective mask should just as well go maskless. 

And another: The stubborn insistence on vaccine mandates implies that the promoters of vaccine mandates still believe that they can end the inevitable spread, however slowed even though 80% of new cases are of fully vaccinated patients, the “breakthrough” rate being >10%, and the re-infection rate, the measure of natural immunity, is around 4%, and nowhere in the world the vaccine has reduced the R0 below 1. (A quicker spread of a mild virus like omicron might actually be more effective if immunity is time-limited, but this doesn’t seem to be factored in at all by anyone. The urgent desire to prevent any spread has closed off the understanding that there is no solution to zero spread, and closed off the possibility of reducing the extent of the spread through rapid spread.)

Finally: violent revolutions do not guarantee that they will yield a better regime rather than a worse, more authoritarian and more violently oppressive one, yet many who are most sensible to the injustices of regimes believe that revolution is the best solution rather than the worst. Pervasive injustice cries out urgently for a solution, so there must be one. 

That’s the fool’s errand attachment. I want to offer an explanation for why victims of it exclude any alternative solution, why some kinds of people are victims of it and other kinds not, and what the personality source of it is. 

Fool’s Errand Attachment often intersects with availability bias (we’ve seen pollution effectively reduced so maybe atmospheric CO2 can be reduced), anchoring and sunk cost fallacy (we’ve invested financially or politically or emotionally in masks and vaccines so we have to stand by them), but unlike the sunk cost, the Fool’s Errand chooses a program that is known to be a failure from the start. It’s this counterproductive choice of the useless that is so interesting in the Fool’s Errand Attachment. The cloth masks may be ineffective, but those without N95s can’t just walk around unmasked! So everyone has to mask, even though the emperor has no clothes. That’s a fool’s errand. Zero emissions is not happening, and it wouldn’t make a difference anyway, but that doesn’t matter — there *must* be a solution, therefore there *is* a solution, no matter what the cost, no matter impossible and absurd, including the many counterproductive measures that will hinder the wealth and well-being of the populations in developing nations for the sake of a zero emissions program that serves no climate good at all and harms many. 

So what’s the moral source of this choice and attachment?

Fool’s Errand Attachment vs Conspiracy Theory

Fool’s errand bias contrasts with conspiracy theory. Victims of Fool’s Errand reject all other possible solutions: natural immunity isn’t possible according to them even though the breakthrough rate for the vaccinated is over 10% while the reinfection rate remains around 4%. And Omicron, a mild disease the free spread of which would likely end the pandemic since it spreads quickly enough to provide herd immunity sufficient to sterilize the virus and end its mutations at once, *must* not be the end of the virus, only masks and vaccines can be the solution! Similar narrowness holds with zero emissions rather than mitigation or sequestering.

Conspiracy theorists provide a fascinating contrast. Conspiracy theorists will believe all sorts of theories, even ones that contradict one another. For them the only banned theory is the mainstream one. Fool’s Errand Attachment: “Nothing but this works!”; Conspiracy Theorizing: “Anything but that is true!”.

This difference between Fool’s Errand Attachment, clinging to one solution only, and Conspiracy Theorizing, accepting any and every theory but the mainstream one, predicts that conspiracy theorists are not motivated by a desire for a solution to the problems they identify. That is, the motivation for a Fool’s Errand is always the perceived urgency of a solution. The desperate need for a solution is what causes the desperate attachment. Conspiracy theorists seem to hold the opposite. Give them a solution and they will reject it. Their view seems to be that the problems of the world are beyond solution. At least, these problems are beyond our capabilities to resolve. There are powers running our world far greater than the meagre powers of the common people. We common people are doomed to be victims. 

Victims of the Fool’s Errand Attachment are utopianists, victims of Conspiracy Theorizing are fatalists. Utopianists consider themselves morally superior on the grounds that they are doing good for all. This predicts that victims of the Fool’s Errand Attachment — let’s call them the Fools for short — will be given to virtue signaling. They want to solve the problems of the world, so they are therefore good people by their definition of good. And they have in hand what they think is the only solution. This need for virtue may itself be the source of their narrowness. To signal virtue one must have not only the desire to do good, but to have a solution. *[But see note below.] If there is no solution, there can be no good to be done. Without a solution, signaling virtue is an empty, facile, cheap mockery. “I can’t do anything to help you, but if I could I would sacrifice myself for you. But all I can do is tell you I’m a good person.” So a virtue-signaler — people who want approval for their virtue — need a program to get behind to give their signal meaning. 

And they are also given to authoritarian oppression to the extent that they believe that they possess the good and therefore are justified in imposing their good on all. No one is quite so oppressive as those who believe they are doing good for all. The Good will justify everything and anything. 

This is the utopian profile: the desire to be perceived as good (virtue signaling) imposes a need for a solution, the solution, their solution. And there seems to be a reason why the solution must be the only solution. To doubt the effectiveness of their solution would be to undermine their virtue signaling. And doubt might suggest that there is no solution, and that would end all virtue, all moral superiority, and all doing-good too. If they cannot admit any possible doubt, then their solution must be the only solution. If any solution can be doubted, then virtue-signaling ends and we live in an ambiguous world of hope and experiment where anybody’s solution might turn out to be better than ours, the only signal left, “I don’t know. Let’s try yours.” 

To put it differently, if the goal is to find a truly effective solution, then flaws in a program will be quickly admitted and the proposal will be rejected. But the Fools are not looking for an effective solution. They are looking for a program to provide them their sense of doing and being good and also appearing to be good. So if there is no solution, they will still have to take up some program for their goal of good identity. That implies rejecting all criticism of their program. So they are narrow and intransigent. And they will be all the more arrogant towards their critics, since they see themselves as doing good (and they cannot admit the flaws of their program both for garden variety confirmation bias but also because they desperately need to hold onto their virtue signal) and see their critics as indifferent to that good, that is to say, those who disagree are evil and are looked down upon with indignation as deplorable. *[But see footnote below.]

The conspiracy theorist harbors a different kind of superiority, not superior morality but superior wisdom. While the bulk of humanity accepts the mainstream view of political actions, the conspiracy theorist knows better. Those who disagree with the conspiracy theorist, or believe that there are solutions, are not evil, but frustratingly foolish and pathetically or angeringly naive. The conspiracy theorist does not insist on being good, but on being right. Their response is not moral indignation but anger or impatience. Both conspiracists and Fools share smugness towards their out-group.

Fool’s errand bias thrives on the political left (revolution here in the US is a fool’s errand, for example — it’s assessed by the need for it, not its likelihood of success) because the left wants to solve all the problems of the world, and childishly believe they can all be resolved. They are fervent, earnest but naive utopianists, and the Fool’s Errand Attachment is their holier-than-thou authoritarian prop. Fool’s errand doesn’t thrive on the right presumably because their interests are narrower — their own personal interests only, national interests rather than internationalist, in-group race rather than diversity-embracing — along with the rejection of all those many left utopian solutions because, you know, the left is their out-group “Them”, so they must be evil and all their programs.

The right is vile; the left is insufferable; everyone else is abused, deceived, manipulated and otherwise victimized by both left and right. 

Other motives for accepting a failed solution beside the Fool’s Errand Attachment, and the source of morality

It’s possible that the ordinary believer in the urgency of zero emissions simply doesn’t know that zero emissions will not solve the problem. That’s not surprising given the overwhelming media attention, including social media attention, given to climate disaster on the one hand, and the near total silence on the facts of atmospheric CO2 longevity on the other. Such attention exacerbates the need for a solution, playing to the Fool’s bias. It may be that media focus on disaster because news leans towards the bad, or it may be because it is convenient and morally comforting to point blame. Whatever the reason, media provides a picture that encourages the Fool’s Errand Attachment. 

Since KN95’s are effective, it’s not quite fair to say that masks are ineffective. It’s mask mandates that are a fool’s errand. Studies show that such mandates don’t work.

But not all maskers are Fools. Probably most cloth maskers simply don’t know that their masks are ineffective. I’m guessing most maskers believe cloth masks are effective because they don’t know the differences between masks and they want to mask because of the The Doctor Says So Bias, and especially because they see so many others sacrificing to mask for what seems to be the best of reasons — the Solidarity Heuristic Error, a cognitive consequence of pluralistic ignorance and The Illusion of Explanatory Depth. It’s a rational conclusion: masks must be effective otherwise why is everyone wearing them? And a kind of information market bubble — a rational cognitive symmetry breaking under stress in ignorance. It’s a powerful influence. Look at the tenacity of religious beliefs that are contrary to all evidence. Grice’s maxims have something essential to say about this gullibility too (a post on this is forthcoming). 

Other maskers, probably relatively few, may have succumbed to the Fool’s Errand and its intersection with availability bias, a sunk cost fallacy and biased anchoring, grasping for a solution where there is none. Still, the Fool’s Errand Attachment seems to hold a strong, broad place in cognition. As someone said to me a couple of years ago at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, “What are you saying — we should let people drop dead in the streets?” The answer, of course, is, if you can’t prevent them from dropping dead in the streets, then yes, you have to let them. When I tried to explain this to someone recently — that if someone is dying and you can’t do anything at all to prevent it, you have no moral obligation to try to prevent it — he looked at me incredulously as if I were Hitler. I doubt it would have helped to say ‘possibility must precede necessity’. Human beings do not generally think with logic. They think with familiar schemas and biases and peer group consensuses and above all approval-seeking from their chosen peer group. Logic is way down on the list of influences on cognition and judgment. 

Offering a non solution may make yourself look good or make you feel better about yourself, but it doesn’t help anyone else. Of course, making oneself look and feel good is a primary motivator of morality — we are after all a social species and create our identities, like it or not, aware of it or not, in response to those we surround ourselves with. When you hold the door for someone coming behind you, you know you’re not providing some important help, especially when that person quickens their pace to prevent compelling you to hold longer. In that case you’re actually inconveniencing that person, not helping. And most everyone for whom we hold doors can open doors by themselves anyway and do so constantly every day. We hold the door largely because we are afraid that if we shut the door in their face, they’d be justified in judging us as a douche. Our self-identity is a function of our perception of others’ perception of us. We want to appear good to them, more than to be good, although we also like to be good so as to feel superior or justified. Being good is mostly a self defense. As a social species, we need morality, and natural selection has given us a variety of emotions that conduce to social behaviors, approval-seeking one among them, and the one that probably most influences our public moral behavior. There are other motivations or incentives, including the warm feeling that you get from the smile in response to holding the door or any such polite gesture — also likely a natural selection emotion that contributes to social cohesion — and the simple convenience of conforming to social norms and habits. None of it is solving a problem for anyone but oneself. 

I revert to my very first thought about the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Global poverty has been so broadly alleviated that we are convinced for the first time in history that we can save everyone, so there’s no justification for giving up. We recognize our moral obligation given to us by the strength of our technology. We have the resources, surely our elected officials can save us all. Previously in human history, poverty was so pervasive, there was no possibility of saving everyone. “Finish your dinner. People are starving in India” was a common U.S. mom’s refrain in the 1960’s. It was a recognition that not everyone could be saved. Things have changed. The elimination of starvation is within sight. And in morality, possibility implies necessity, in other words, obligation; if we can save the world, then we are obliged to do so. But, unfortunately, we are deceived by our own wealth and technology. Eliminating a highly contagious virus is still beyond our capacity without unsustainable sacrifices.

Further questions about this cognitive bias

If the Fool’s Errand Attachment differs from other cognitive biases in not being universal across all persons but applies more to utopianists than to non utopianists and fatalists, examining it may give us further insight about cognitive and emotional differences between such different groups.

It’s a good question what the basis of the difference might be. We’re all familiar with studies that show correlations between liberalism and conservatives in their feelings about disgust, for example, but how and why someone becomes the one or the other isn’t so clear. Neither is it clear which is the cause. Is it the inclination towards conservatism or liberalism that causes a greater or lesser inclination to be disgusted, or vice versa — levels of disgust causing a political position — or are they both reflexes of some other underlying disposition. The popular assumption is that levels of disgust causes the politics, but there’s an older tradition that says otherwise, expressed in W.S.Gilbert’s wicked silly joke:

How Nature always does contrive

That every boy and every gal

That’s born into the world alive

Is either a little Liberal

Or else a little Conservative!

The joke, of course, is not that it’s so absurd to think that we’d be born with a politics. The joke is that it’s so true.

And it not only shows how absurd we are as political partisans, but also how utterly absurd politics itself is. To put it bluntly, the choice of politics is mostly identity, not deliberation. The deliberation, as we all now know having learnt the lessons of behavioral psych, applies only to confirming the views we’ve already chosen, or attacking the ones we didn’t choose, even if these were selected already in our childhood identities. It makes one wonder whether politics might be the one area of human interests where algorithms would work better than human deliberation. 

The Fool’s Errand Attachment and confirmation bias

I heard yesterday Richard Wolff explaining to Lex Fridman why reformists usually win against revolutionaries: revolution is scary and violently dangerous. He made no mention at all that revolution is risky, that in most circumstances there is no guarantee that a revolution will result in an improved regime or progress of any kind. More likely, the winner will be the possessor of the superior force and weaponry and there’s no reason to believe that the most and best weapons and good regime should be aligned. The opposite is more likely. It is reasonable to expect the winner of a revolution to be the more violent and therefore be less needy of popular support, less caring of that support, and more oppressive, since the weapons that won the revolution are easily turned to maintaining authority. Nevertheless, many on the Left still insist on discussing revolution as if it were a solution even where appropriate conditions of success are not even remotely available. But there must be a revolution because if not, there’s no solution to the urgent injustices we live with and our comforting position of knowing what’s better would be lost. 

I notice that revolutionaries in the US are full of detailed complaints about our current society, but they never discuss how to manage a revolution or work on tactics and strategies, and almost all of them spend no thought on solutions or alternative means of structuring a society, and when they do, they do not examine the unintended consequences, look for the flaws or consider the possible failures. It’s all confirmation bias — accepting any cheap support for the view of what the world should be and blindness to any criticism. It’s not surprising that Marx’s Capital, lengthy as it is, provides no details on how a society should be structured. It’s all criticism of capital. Likewise, libertarians have endless criticisms of socialism, but don’t seem to understand the most obvious flaws in an unregulated market. It seems that everyone understands the enemy in detail, but accepts an absurdly simplistic view of what they themselves support. Want to understand capitalism? Don’t ask a libertarian supporter of capitalism. Their understanding is superficial and pollyanna-ish. Read Marx, if you want to understand capital. Want to understand communism or socialism, don’t bother with Marx. Read a libertarian. They’ve a got a grasp on every possible failing of it, and to understand those failings they need to understand the system deeply. 

* [A friend points out that many virtue signals include no solution, for example a rainbow flag or Black Lives Matter banner on one’s lawn. This shows an interesting intersection between virtue signaling and identity or partisanship signaling, and implies that Fool’s Errand Attachments may also be mere identity signaling. Consider two neighbors, both white and heteronormative, one displaying a MAGA banner and an American flag, the other a rainbow flag and a BLM banner. Both are signaling partisanship-identity, but only one is viewed as signaling virtue. The signals of the Left purport to reflect a kind of excess of thoughtfulness, on the one hand thinking beyond the in-group interests to think about the Other’s interests and embracing the out-group, with an added sophistication of hypocrisy, thinking more about how those thoughts will be evaluated by others than the value of the thoughts in themselves. The signals of the Right are routinely viewed as an absence of thought, patriotism often described as “blind”, accepting positions for the sake of in-group loyalty rather than deliberation, giving little thought to those positions and even less thought to the out-group interests. The difference between Left identity virtue signaling and Fool’s Errand Attachments may simply amount to signaling an acceptance of the out-group (whatever it may want for itself) versus having a solution to an impending problem for the in-group and out-group both. So embracing the Other is another way to signal virtue, one that does not require any specific solution, and offering a solution might even be viewed as odious paternalism to be avoided by the signaler. Nonetheless, paternalist or not, promoting gender non conformity in early schooling and defunding the police are solutions promoted by Left partisanship-identity signalers.]


Before reading “Art, craft, game-theoretic cognition and machine learning”

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, July 12, 2022

A few essentials about the language game: language is cooperation; cooperation, far from being occasional among us, is the underlying condition of humanity as water is to a fish. Cooperation is so basic to our nature that we scarcely notice it. We share a code and share it among us constantly. We are the conversing species. The seven points below are an expansion of H. Paul Grice’s insights into conversational logic. 

  1. It is obvious that language evolved and survived for the purpose of conversation — sharing information. As powerful as symbolism is for an individual alone — to have a symbol “yesterday” or “tomorrow” or “will” or “may” or “could” or “not” let alone “could not have” or “couldn’t not have” allows us to think about imaginaries beyond the real, possibilities, counterfactuals and even impossibilities, that non symbolic minds cannot think about — as powerful as that individual possession is, it is vastly more powerful for a species to use it for sharing information. Cultural transmission allows rapid technological accrual; instruction on self-protection allows a species to evolve out of instinctual behavior into flexible choice-behaviors including interacting with the world through understanding rather than narrow instinctual responses to it. 

  2. If conversation is the purpose of language, then analysing the code (words, grammar, sounds) alone will only get you so far. Language can’t be fully understood except in the context of interaction, and that interaction turns out to be game-theoretic, that is, the value of the symbols (roughly, the words) do not depend only on their value in the code (the language). The most obvious and simple example is sarcasm. The conversational context will determine the final meaning or value of the symbol in a particular conversational situation or context. So even knowing the code and all its symbols does not suffice for understanding the meaning or value of those code-defined symbols.

  3. Language is a form of cooperation. It is also the most distinctive behavior of the species. It is a constant behavior, whether in conversation with others or with oneself. The cooperation in language holds even when we argue vehemently: we do so sharing the same code, and our arguments are most vehement when we desperately want the other to agree with us, demonstrating a need for each other in argument as in any other sharing of information. This communication cooperation is accompanied with other forms of cooperation like politeness, deference and even morality. Self-identity — arranging our appearance so that others will understand our place in relation to them — is itself also a form of cooperation. Your choice of clothing, western or ethnic or even weird, are forms of cooperation, accepting the norms even when rebelling, since the rebellion is a rebellion against a norm with a meaning recognized and accepted as such by the rebel. IOW, your most common interactions and even your identity are all forms of cooperation, although we don’t view these as cooperation at all. We take them for granted since they are the underlying conditions of being and living in a culture. 

  4. Anyone who thinks humans are a combination of occasional competitiveness balanced with occasional cooperativeness doesn’t understand what “social species” means. We can’t make it on our own. Together we build bridges, fly across the world, conduct wars, understand the origins of the universe. The role of the individual competitor is utterly trivial compared with the cooperativeness of cultural transmission and collective actions. This is the meaning of Newton’s “I stand on the shoulders of giants.” Even competition in a market is working to supply what people want — yet another pervasive aspect of cooperation, the necessary condition for competition is that cooperation of buying and selling under the mutual assumption of trust.

  5. Language, the most powerful tool of our species, would never have evolved without the default assumption that what people tell us is true. If we all assumed that we’re being lied to, there’d be no point in conversing at all and language would never have evolved as a species trait. That it did evolve and survive and thrive, demonstrates that our default assumption must be and must have always been that what we are being told is true. That is why it is possible to deceive someone with a lie. If we didn’t assume truth, no one could ever deceive with a lie. And we can deceive with a lie. That’s the meaning of “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” For a society with speech, the default assumption must be that everyone is at least sincere and generally accurate. Doubt must be justified. The default must be belief, otherwise we would never have evolved language.

  6. This logic of language evolution predicts that humans must be deeply and fundamentally gullible. And, of course, we are. The prediction is abundantly evidenced. Anthropologists and atheists wonder why humans believe in beings without any evidence, invisible beings, absurd beings, fanciful beings, deities, angels, Djinns, devils. The reasons should be obvious. We’re gullible — otherwise we would have no language. We’re social. We’re deeply devoted to, cooperative with, our group. The power of language — that it allows us the flexibility to believe beyond instinctual behaviors that protect us; the gullibility that facilitates cultural transmission; this constellation of cooperativeness that keeps us together and powerful — overcomes every weakness attending it, and that includes the fantasy land of religion. And like any fictional story, the fantasy itself will have some value to its listeners. Where it distinguishes the Us vs Them, all the more value when it isn’t practical (“We do it this ridiculous way just to show that we’re not you! So there.”)

  7. We’re actually somewhat stupid as a species. Chimps can handle game-theoretic activities faster and better than we do, and it seems because we’re constantly second guessing each other. We’re invested in what others think. It’s part of the gullibility of conversation and our cooperative sociality. It’s smart in one way — to consider other minds that way, not just what I think and want– but stupid in another. It slows us down and complicates decisions. If you depend on what others do, and not what they think, it’s easier to predict others’ behavior. But if you second guess the other, and assume the other is second guessing you, it’s impossible to make any decision.

Now on to art, craft and artificial intelligence. 


Art, craft, game-theoretic cognition and machine learning

Originally published on Language and Philosophy, July 12, 2022

Here in Istanbul, you cannot but admire the Turkish carpet and the mosques of Sinan, the carpet a wonder of intricacy, the more complex and detailed the more wondrous, and Sinan’s grand mosques a wonder of simplicity, purity and restraint even when scaled to the most expansive heights. If you are an idle wonderer with time to think about questions almost too obvious to ask, you might puzzle over why are there no simple carpets when the simplicity of the mosques is so overwhelmingly effective. Why can’t carpet makers avail themselves of modest simplicity in their craft, when purity and humility can reach so deeply into the human heart and mind?

The goals of craft are not the goals of art, no doubt. But what’s the difference? Or better, why such a difference? A good libertarian, and a good Darwinian — and they might as well be the same — would ask first where the market incentives lie. The answer will go a long way to explain the traditional crafts of intricacy. Maybe not so far with art.

First, let’s look at the differences. Craft can be learnt by almost anyone. That this is so couldn’t be more obvious from the tradition of handing the craft from generation to generation. Not so with art. There are a few great arts families, the Bachs and Holbeins and Mendelsohns, and certainly Beethoven and Mozart grew up in musical families, but how many of us listen avidly to Beethoven senior’s compositions (I’ve never heard of a single one) or of papa Mozart or even Bach’s sons, famous as they were in their day. I’d guess that Holbein’s brother, had he not died so young, would have surpassed Hans, but this is the exception that proves the rule. That is, Ambrosius proves by demonstration that extraordinary artistic talent can be shared within a family, so why not the Bachs, the Mozarts, the Beethovens, and whatever happened to Vincent’s brother Theo, the art dealer and all the other artistically talentless siblings, parents and children?

So maybe the incentive is to blame. The traditional crafts provide a reliable source of income, the arts don’t, so children or siblings of artists might choose an alternative route. But this unreliability is only relevant to unsuccessful artists, so the incentive argument begs the question. Successful artists can be far wealthier than any craftsperson. The question has merely been restated: why is a career in the arts riskier than the crafts so safe; why are the arts not reliable sources of income? And now also a mystery, why does anyone pursue art if the financial incentive lacks reliability?

Stay for a moment with the crafts, handed from generation to generation, a traditional income for the whole family. If the craft is a reliable source and so the incentive then is income — the reliability draws the income-seeking — then the goal of craft is income. This too seems obvious just looking at the intricacy of such crafts, since intricacy is labor made visible. The more labor devoted to the artifact, the more evidence of it in the product, the more value. What is the patron looking for and paying for in a traditional craft, after all? The wealthy patron wants an artifact that demonstrates visibly to the patron’s friends or clients or guests that this object bought a high price, so he must be wealthy with money to burn. There’s your incentive and there’s the explanation for all that intricacy. The more intricate, the more proof of labor, the more value in the artifact, the more evidence of the wealth of the patron. Simplicity in such a context, signals absence of labor, lack of value. There’s no room for the virtues of simplicity. It plays a role only if there is a down market of cheap goods for fashion followers who haven’t the resources to buy an expensive carpet.

So the financial incentive yields an artifact that confines itself to intricacy for the purpose of appealing to the patron’s pocket, not to the patron’s emotions, not to his ideas or his politics, not to his morality, not to his mind. Just his pocket. Pay more, get more labor in the artifact in the form of greater intricacy. The craft and its artifact is a relationship between the laborer’s skill and the material she or he works and the pay it gets, nothing more. The only modulations are between more labor (intricacy) and more material — more items or larger items.

What about the arts? An artist must also master the skill of manipulating a material, but has to manipulate as well the emotions or ideas, or politics or moral sense of the audience. The art is a relation between the artist, the material and the mind of the audience, and really the primary material is the audience’s mind. To manipulate the mind, the artist will often hide the craft (the labor) to achieve a seamless illusion of reality, not display the artist’s intent to manipulate, which would undermine the manipulation. (That’s why Brecht’s breaking the fourth wall was radically innovative — the point of drama is to create the illusion of reality, not draw attention to the author.)

The art will also have content, not just intricacy. The content may refer beyond the material. It may consider the context surrounding the art — in drama the context might be the society and its ills, say, or for architecture the entire cityscape. The artifact must not be just an elaborate structure. It must have a place in the world, to the audience’s mind. It can even create a world. Art is an interactive game between artist and other minds and anything that could be contained in that mind. It may contain many worlds, unbounded in number and form.

What about the incentive?

Well, yes, what about the incentive. Like the best of the sciences and maybe all of sports, the primary incentive is not financial, it’s some other kind of reward. Recognition and approval, esteem and pride must be in there, and competition among peers, but surely, above all, the love of engagement with the audience through the artform. Money? That might be a necessary condition, not sufficient for an artist’s choice.

What is it about this game theoretic activity — the manipulation of other minds — that draws or cultivates such extraordinary abilities? It’s not dull labor for financial gain. That’s a one-dimensional activity. The artist might even challenge and insult the audience. Not a craftsperson. Artistry is more social and more fun.

So how is all this related to machine learning and Grice?

*****

I was listening to a couple of Sean Carroll podcasts a few weeks ago, one interviewing Tai-Danae Bradley, the other with Gary Marcus, both about machine learning. The Yoneda Lemma is the connection. The Yoneda Lemma, according to Tai-Danae Bradley, tells us that the meaning of a word can be completely derived from all its contexts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OynLbSzLS9s&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Flanguageandphilosophy.wordpress.com%2F&source_ve_path=MjM4NTE&feature=emb_title

I can think of at least four challenges to this broad behaviorist, reductionist assertion. For one, a neologism may be introduced by its coiner with clear meaning, but its full contexts may be underdetermined. The coiner will understand it in detail, but a machine learner won’t have access to that information. To assert that the meaning of the word is underdetermined would be a circular argument on the one hand, and would be to ignore that the coiner may have had a clear and distinct concept of its meaning even though others in the speech community might not, and that those others in the language community, reading this coinage, will likely be able to guess its meaning by a kind of process of elimination — looking at first which possible familiar words is this new word replacing. That is, we can learn not just by the contexts of the word, but using contexts analogous to the context at hand, and inserting an expected word to derive the expected meaning, then reverse engineer the meaning of the new word.

A second challenge is a sorites-type puzzle. Contexts may be inconsistent. At what point do we judge that, say, “meme” refers to ideas that circulate among humans (following its coiner, Dawkins) or an online gif, often including either a cat or movie clip, used in place of a linguistically articulated judgment? This puzzle usually has an easy solution. The word has become ambiguous with two historically related but now very distinct meanings. The slippery slope here isn’t disastrous either. It’s no skin off my tooth to grant that the Australian Prime Minister’s idealect — his personal dialectician of English — has a “suppository of wisdom”, or that Rick Perry’s has “lavatories of innovation”. I’m sure I’ve made equally silly maladropisms without even confusing the reader. More likely the reader is amused or gloating depending on how sophisticated or how much of a troll the reader is, but not confused. So let a thousand flowers boom.

A third raises an old behavioral, reductionist quandary. It comes from Willard van Orman Quine. Consider any two concepts that denote the same set of individuals. His example was cordates and renates, animals with a heart and those with a kidney. Now all mammals have hearts and also have kidneys. So the expression “mammalian cordates” and “mammalian renates” designate the same set, but they clearly don’t have the same meaning and if it’s possible that every known, actual use (as distinct from every possible use) of one could be exchanged for the other, then like the neologism, the contexts won’t access the difference of meaning in the mind of their users.

All these cases assume that we know the meanings of the words somehow beyond the contexts in which they are used. If we humans knew the meaning of words only by their contexts, then we would be such big data learners, and the words “renate” and “cordate”, if the actual contexts never distinguished them, would have to be considered synonymous. The reason we don’t is simply because we avail ourselves of the dictionary. Of course, the dictionary is a context too, so if we include the dictionary in machine learning then there will be strong evidence that the Yoneda Lemma is true. But if the machine learner avails itself of the dictionary, then who needs a Yoneda Lemma or big data, just consult the dictionary — insert the meaning of words as brutal input, the machine now knows, but no learning has happened. And no prediction of language shift either, since the dictionary is just a reflection of historical use, not a determiner of it. 

This is really all to say that what’s in the mind is not necessarily accounted for by the actions that proceed from the possessor of the mind. Knowing and doing are not identical, so there should be circumstances in which the two could be distinguished so that gathering the one will not account entirely for the other. One might imagine having taken an action without actually having done it. It’s delusional, but it happens, probably more often than we’d like to admit. Or the reality we believe we live in might not have an unambiguous relation to the actual physical world we live in. We might be certain of what a zipper is, without realizing that we don’t know how it works, or think we know exactly what some deity is but when pushed can’t say exactly any of its properties. Obversely, as in the Quine cases, one’s actions might be ambiguous evidence for one’s decisions or ideas.

Gary Marcus in his interview addresses similar problems for machine learning. Not everything humans know can be known by extensional learning — big behavioral data. (I think we should give it the name BBG because it is a very specific kind of limited data, and I’m going to suggest a different kind of data for learning.) Gathering behaviors may account for actual actions, but not possible actions, and the possible actions reveal the difference between the mere denotation in the actual world and the meaning of the word.

Machine learning is fully adequate to extensional use of language — the actual uses in the real world — but not for intensions, which include all possible uses beyond the actual ones, where machine learning runs straight up against the inductive fallacy. (This is a pretty thorough historical treatment from Frege to Montague and Quine, this is a very brief summary of the background issues. Here’s the Marcus interview)

So much for the familiar challenges. I want to look at a fourth problem for machine learning, a game theoretic problem that seems to be missing from the AI discussion. The meaning of an expression in use — in conversation, which is the point of language and without which symbolic language would never have evolved — is a game theoretic equilibrium, not restricted to the value (meaning or reference) of the word defined in the code/language.

Think of the difference between coding for a simple input-output device versus an interactive interface in which the algorithm must “guess” at the intentions of the user. This is analogous to what I was saying about traditional decorative “intricacy” crafts, which are a relation between the craftsperson and the material (for the sake of exhibiting labor in the product for the rich patron) via the tools of the technology that manipulate the material, as compared with arts where the relation is between the craftsperson and the audience via those tools but also via Theory of Mind to manipulate the mind of the audience — the user. So for machine learning, a sarcastic use of, say, “brilliant” (“You got an A: brilliant!” “You dumped hot coffee in my lap. Brilliant!”) will be interpreted as a homophony or auto-antonymy — the sound sequence “brilliant” having two meanings, in effect two words with identical sounds like “fast” (run fast, an intermittent fast) or “left” (she left home, she took a left turn) or auto-antonyms like “cleave” (cleave to a friend, cleave apart) or “dust” (dust a field with glyphosate, dust the table with a rag).

But for English speakers, sarcasm is not homophony or auto-antonymy. It’s a self-same word used differently depending on the mutual knowledge of the conversation members: you got an A, brilliant; you spilled hot coffee in my lap, brilliant — as code, the symbol still means “smart”. Proof: replace “brilliant” with a synonym like “smart” and the two meanings are unchanged — not so with “cleave” or “fast (run quickly, intermittent quickly??)”.  The value in the conversational game is an equilibrium based on mutual information (speaker and addressee both know spilling coffee is not brilliant according to its conventional meaning or use in English). 

So this is yet another failure of extensional inductive learning — a particularly narrow one-sided materialist reductionism. In other words, a truly successful machine learner, beyond merely gathering or analysing data, would have to *experiment* with synonyms of “brilliant” and “fast” to figure out the type of use difference and then *speculate* on why there’s such a difference — *conjecturing* on what’s actually represented in the mind of the speakers. It’d have to engage in the speculative process of scientific theory creation, not just calculating averages. Prediction, experiment, followed by error correction, but not just Popper-style or if you prefer, Friston-style, but a game-theoretic prediction, Darwin- or Dawkins-style (as in sexual selection or the extended phenotype where the products of selection themselves participate in the selection), answering the question not “what is this symbol’s fixed reference in use?” but “what are the rules of this game?” You see the difference.

Sarcasm is only one of many consequences of this Gricean game-theoretic equilibrium. Grice mentions “possibly” and its (defeasible) implicature of “not actual”. So in “It’s possible to construct a car that runs 300mph. In fact, Fiat made one but couldn’t market it” the “in fact” phrase is used to remove the implicature that “it’s possible, but merely possible, not yet actual”, an implicature which would stand were it not for the “in fact” phrase. Similarly, “it might be raining” implicates that it might also not be raining. These implicatures are explained by Grice’s game theoretical rules. It also has broad evolutionary implications for human gullibility, including adherence to religious beliefs (yet another discussion), cases in which humans fail when chimps succeed, and further supports Marcus’ point in the podcast.


Musk again? A lesson in inefficiency and ambiguity

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